Selective self-categorization: Meaningful categorization and the in-group persuasion effect

Research stemming from self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) has demonstrated that individuals are typically more persuaded by messages from their in-group than by messages from the out-group. The present research investigated the role of issue relevance in moderating these effects. In particular, it was predicted that in-groups would only be more persuasive when the dimension on which group membership was defined was meaningful or relevant to the attitude issue. In two studies, participants were presented with persuasive arguments from either an in-group source or an out-group source, where the basis of the in-group/out-group distinction was either relevant or irrelevant to the attitude issue. Participants' attitudes toward the issue were then measured. The results supported the predictions: Participants were more persuaded by in-group sources than out-group sources when the basis for defining the group was relevant to the attitude issue. However, when the defining characteristic of the group was irrelevant to the attitude issue, participants were equally persuaded by in-group and out-group sources. These results support the hypothesis that the fit between group membership and domain is an important moderator of self-categorization effects

Giving voters what they want? Party orientation perceptions and preferences in the British electorate

Some of the most important propositions in the political marketing literature hinge on assumptions about the electorate. In particular, voters are presumed to react in different ways to different orientations or postures. Yet there are theoretical reasons for questioning some of these assumptions, and certainly they have seldom been empirically tested. Here, we focus on one prominent example of political marketing research: Lees-Marshment’s orientations’ model. We investigate how the public reacts to product and market orientation, whether they see a trade-off between the two (a point in dispute among political marketing scholars), and whether partisans differ from non-partisan voters by being more inclined to value product over market orientation. Evidence from two mass sample surveys of the British public (both conducted online by YouGov) demonstrates important heterogeneity within the electorate, casts doubt on the core assumptions underlying some political marketing arguments and raises broader questions about what voters are looking for in a party

Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level

The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0096-4.The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks—election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election

Legislative Participation in the EU: An analysis of questions, speeches, motions and declarations in the 7th European Parliament

Which legislative activities in the European Parliament are ‘pluralistic’ – i.e. undertaken by all Members of the European Parliament, irrespective of legislative and electoral status? What type of parliamentary activity – if any – is dominated by party leaderships or vote-seekers in the European Union? This study will advance our knowledge of legislative politics in the EU by determining whether its legislature conforms to expectations from the legislative behaviour literature. This study compares the participation patterns in the EP7 (2009–2014) parliamentary questions, speeches, motions and written declarations via multilevel negative binomial regression. It makes use of a dataset on activity levels and demographics of 842 individual Members of the European Parliament serving between 2009 and 2014. The findings highlight that highly procedurally constrained activities, such as speeches and oral questions, are dominated by frontbenchers and vote-seekers, while procedurally ‘freer’ activities – written questions in particular – are very representative of the population of Members of the European Parliament. The analysis finds that there are both ‘pluralistic’ and vote-seeking activities in the ‘second order’ EU legislature, and that participation patterns broadly conform to patterns found in other established representative democracies

Earmarks and Subcommittee Government in the U.S. Congress

In recent years, considerable scholarly attention has focused on earmarks, the quintessential example of pork barrel politics. We assess the degree to which existing theories can explain the distribution of earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives. First, drawing on informal interviews with individuals on Capitol Hill regarding the earmark process, we argue that assessing institutional and constituency-level factors that affect the earmark receipts of individual members requires examination at the level of the Appropriations subcommittees. Second, we demonstrate that both distributive and partisan theories of legislative organization are applicable to the distribution of earmarks. Finally, we present results indicating that contrary to the conventional wisdom, most subcommittees do not distribute pork based on electoral vulnerability. Rather, legislators’ status in the appropriations process has the most influence. These findings offer insights into the path forward as debate continues over congressionally directed spending.Yeshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guideline